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be appropriate liquidity policy of banks. Nonetheless, solvent banks can face liquidity 
difficulties at times of stress, necessitating liquidity support. The traditional role of the lender 
of last resort (LOLR) is to avoid unnecessary failures that could threaten systemic stability, 
while ensuring that there are suitable safeguards for central bank balance sheets and that 
moral hazard is minimised. The sub-prime crisis has shown that traditional models of bank 
liquidity risk and of LOLR require revision, as was already apparent to a lesser extent in the 
Russia/LTCM episode. Funding risk now interacts with market liquidity risk, to create 
difficult challenges for central banks. The LOLR has had to adapt radically, for example, in 
terms of lending to investment banks, taking lower quality collateral and lending for longer 
maturities. Central banks have also been challenged by difficulties in maintaining 
confidentiality of support and by the interaction of these problems with low levels of deposit 
insurance. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to assess the importance of liquidity in financial crises and how the 
authorities may deal with it. It starts from the concept of bank runs – whereby the nature of 
banking means that solvent banks may at times be subject to panic runs and consequent 
illiquidity – and their ubiquity in most crises to date. Contagion may arise via credit risk 
linkages to other banks. This is a problem of “funding liquidity”. It then considers the 
authorities’ response to crises in terms of lender of last resort (LOLR) – illustrated by 
historical examples – and the evolving “doctrine” of LOLR.  
 
The paper then goes on to assess how liquidity problems during the current crisis have 
differed from the past. During this crisis the authorities have had to adapt their LOLR policy 
to a crisis which is not merely one of “funding liquidity” but also of “market liquidity” (IMF 
2008, Davis 1994), while contagion has occurred more via market prices and less via credit 
risk (Adrian and Shin 2008) and new “amplifiers” of financial instability have become 
apparent (Brunnermeier 2008). The LOLR has had to adapt radically, for example, in terms of 
lending to investment banks, taking lower quality collateral and lending at longer maturities. 
It has also been challenged by difficulties in maintaining confidentiality of support and the 
interaction of these problems with low levels of deposit insurance. 
 
1 Liquidity in financial crises 
 
Liquidity risk, in general, is the risk that an asset owner is unable to recover the full value of 
their asset when sale is desired. One type of liquidity risk is funding risk, which relates to the 
ease with which one can raise money by borrowing using an asset as collateral. Liquidity risk 
of this type has always played a key role in banking crises. This section provides a benchmark 
against which to compare previous episodes to the sub-prime crisis.  
 
Bank assets – particularly loans – are by their nature illiquid and long term, and subject to 
imperfect information, while liabilities are mostly liquid and short term. These short-term 
liabilities are conceptually a means of disciplining bank managers via the threat of bank runs, 
as they help to ensure that bank managers take depositors’ interests into account by not taking 
excessive risks in their choice of asset holdings (Kaufman 1988). But depositors’ monitoring 
of projects is likely to be prone to error, making banks vulnerable to “overdiscipline” (and 
possibly runs on solvent banks) leading to socially wasteful liquidation of projects. Owing to 
the fire sale problem – that is, the inability to realise assets at full value owing to asymmetric 
information – illiquid banks can rapidly become insolvent. 
 
Once one bank has experienced a run, there is the possibility of contagion, with runs on other 
banks. Depositors may react either to balance sheet similarities with the failed institution 
under uncertainty and asymmetric information (Morgan 2002), or to perceived counterparty 
exposures with the failed bank. Contagion could, in turn, impact on the wider economy via 
monetary contraction, or credit contraction owing to the difficulty individual borrowers may 
have in establishing new credit relations with a different financial institution when their bank 
fails (Freixas et al 2000a). Note, however, that widespread bank runs need not imply 
contagion. An alternative possibility, as was arguably the case with the banking crises in 
Scandinavia in the early 1990s, is that there is a macroeconomic shock of such magnitude that 
many banks become simultaneously insolvent. 
 
There are various models of bank runs. The best known is the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
model, in which banks provide liquidity insurance to risk averse depositors. Normally the 
demand for repayment by depositors is predictable, and can be catered for by a low level of 
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liquid assets, however, if the bank is forced to sell its illiquid assets in a “fire sale”, then it 
may not realise sufficient cash to cover all of its deposits. Then some depositors may run, if 
they suspect other depositors will also do so, as they fear being last in the queue for cash (that 
is, there is a coordination problem). This pattern may lead to insolvency of a potentially sound 
institution. 
 
The Diamond-Dybvig model assumes that bank runs are purely random events. Alternatively, 
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) suggest that adverse information leads to panics – that is, 
systematic risks are inferred from what may be idiosyncratic. Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) 
focus on the role that information of depositors may have on the quality of bank assets. 
Gorton (1988) saw panics occurring mainly in recessions, which confirms the adverse 
information hypothesis, since panics occur close to the period when business failures are most 
widespread. 
 
Runs are traditionally assumed to take place among retail depositors, but large wholesale 
depositors are increasingly more important. Wholesale depositors are generally better 
informed and less likely to be covered by deposit insurance and (as discussed below) banks 
are increasingly dependent on wholesale funding. The interbank market is a key locus of runs 
in recent years, including, for example, the failures in the United States of Franklin National 
in 1974 and Continental Illinois in 1984. 
 
Of course, the systemic importance of interbank markets has been increased by recent trends 
in financial innovation. For example, there is a growing need for liquidity owing to growth in 
international trading and transactions – notably over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives can give 
rise to unexpected liquidity demands – and also of large value interbank payments systems 
using real time gross settlement (RTGS). Nevertheless, although there have been individual 
bank failures, the domestic interbank markets of the advanced countries have historically been 
fairly robust. 
 
The international interbank market has been a major focus of liquidity crises, as in the Asian 
Crisis of 1997. Bernard and Bisignano (2000) highlight a number of features of the 
international interbank market that contribute to this. They include, first, the typical lack of 
security (collateral) and low levels of information gathering. These may in turn be linked to 
moral hazard via implicit guarantees by central banks for the interbank market’s functioning. 
The existence of the interbank market may also lead banks to underinvest in liquidity. A range 
of banks with low credit quality (as in East Asia up to the crisis of 1997) may operate in it so 
long as lenders believe the implicit guarantees. The international interbank market is typically 
subject to quantity and not price rationing of credit, due to low levels of information on credit 
risk. The short maturity makes withdrawal easy, and more generally, the market is vulnerable 
to sudden increases in credit rationing during periods of stress, as a result of adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems. These shortcomings give rise to a potential for contagion and 
global transmission of shocks.  
 
Theory has begun to catch up with this shift in importance from retail to wholesale runs.
2
 For 
example, Allen and Gale (2000) highlight the possibility that systemic risks in the interbank 
market can vary with the structure of creditor relations. Most risky is a structure with 
unilateral exposure chains among banks, while there is less risk of contagion when all banks 
lend to each other, as the effects of shocks are less concentrated. In between these two types 
of structures is a tiered structure of money centre banks on which other banks rely (Freixas et 
al 2000b). 
                                                 
2
 For a survey of the theory, see De Bandt and Hartmann (2001). 
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2 Liquidity policy of banks 
 
Banks can protect against liquidity risk. Most obviously this can be done by holding a 
significant proportion of liquid assets (a so-called net defensive position). Cash is then 
available to be used immediately to answer liquidity needs, while government securities can 
be used readily as collateral. However, banks seek to avoid holding liquid assets given the 
cost in terms of lower profitability, the low frequency of crises, limited liability of 
shareholders, and the safety net, as discussed below. There have been major declines in asset 
liquidity over recent decades, for example in the United Kingdom, banks’ liquid assets were 
30 per cent of the total in the 1950s, but today are only 1 per cent (Goodhart 2007). 
 
Banks can dissipate withdrawal risk by diversifying funding sources. This is liability 
management, which aims to ensure the continuity and cost effectiveness of funding 
(Greenbaum and Thakor 2007). There are three key issues. The first is to ensure enough 
diversification to reduce liquidity risk, among, for example, certificates of deposit (CDs), 
eurodollars, repurchase agreements (repos), subordinated debt and contingent credit facilities 
from other banks as well as interbank, time and demand deposits. Securitisation is a further 
instrument for liability management.
3
 The second is to ensure the appropriate mix of 
traditional deposits and investment products. Deposits typically incorporate services, have 
payoffs that are insensitive to the fortunes of the intermediary, are for small/uninformed users 
and are insured, so their demand  for such depositsis usually stable. Investment products are 
typically risk-sensitive, for large/informed users, have payoffs that vary with the 
intermediary’s performance, involve monitoring, and hence demand may be more volatile. 
The third is the choice of maturity structure – duration matching affects the degree of liquidity 
risk, but may also reduce flexibility. 
 
A further backup is holding adequate capital to ensure that creditworthiness is maintained in 
the face of adverse shocks. However, experience has shown that adequate capital according to 
current rules is not always sufficient to ensure liquidity problems are avoided, as solvent 
banks can suffer runs due to illiquidity. Regulation of bank liquidity is less developed than for 
capital, and not subject to international agreement.
4
 Compulsory reserve requirements are one 
policy for ensuring that banks hold liquidity, although their main purpose is for collateral in 
central bank monetary operations, overall monetary control and payments system functioning. 
Reserves are not readily available to meet a liquidity spike, especially if there is a mandatory 
minimum ratio. There is also typically qualitative oversight of liquidity policy in the context 
of prudential supervision (Pillar 2 of Basel II). 
 
Goodhart (2007) argues that generous provision of liquidity by central banks, in normal times 
and times of crisis, has made banks careless in liquidity risk management, with low liquid 
assets and reckless liability management. The banks are seen as taking a liquidity “put” with 
the downside risk of liquidity crises covered by the central bank. It is to the LOLR, that is, 
liquidity policy in times of emergency, that I now turn. 
 
3 The lender of last resort (LOLR) 
 
I now go on to outline the doctrine of the LOLR, citing examples from history which are 
relevant to each point. These are the “accepted wisdom” which, I argue, is called into question 
by the sub-prime crisis. 
                                                 
3
 For some discussion of contingent credit facilities see Gatev et al (2006). 
4
 Rochet and Vives (2004) show that a combination of liquidity requirements, capital requirements and the 
lender of last resort can prevent coordination failure in interbank markets. 
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3.1 The nature and history of LOLR 
 
The LOLR is generally described as an institution, such as the central bank, which has the 
ability to produce, at its discretion, currency or “high-powered money” to support institutions 
facing liquidity difficulties and to create enough base money to offset public desire to switch 
into money during a crisis, thereby delaying legal insolvency of an institution and preventing 
fire sales and calling of loans.  
 
The LOLR operation is by discretionary provision of liquidity (against collateral) to an 
institution or market to offset an adverse shock that creates an abnormal increase in demand 
for liquidity. The aim of the LOLR is to prevent illiquidity at an individual bank from leading 
to insolvency (owing to the fire sale problem, as defined above). Thereby it may avoid runs 
that spill over from bank to bank (contagion, as defined above), which may in turn lead to an 
impact on real wealth and GDP that would not occur in the absence of the panic. LOLR needs 
to act rapidly before illiquidity becomes insolvency and before such a panic begins to take 
hold. 
 
I first briefly note historical developments before World War II. Although Thornton wrote 
first about the concept in 1802, the genesis of LOLR in practice is often thought to be the 
aftermath of the Overend Gurney crisis of 1866, when the Bank of England failed to prevent a 
crisis, which was subsequently reflected upon by Bagehot (1873). Put simply, he argued that 
the central bank should lend freely at a penalty rate against good collateral. Furthermore, the 
central bank has to act in the public interest and not solely its private interests, as the Bank 
may have done in 1866. The classic operation of LOLR was reflected, for example, in the 
rescue of Barings Bank by the Bank of England in 1890, as well as in panics during 1878 and 
1914 (Bordo 1990). As noted by Goodhart (1988), these events took place during the period 
of the Gold Standard when the central bank was the institution maintaining convertibility of 
the currency with gold, which made it a natural LOLR, albeit generally also involving other 
banks in rescues given the limitation of its own capital base.
5
 Combined with uncertainty 
regarding rescues, the “club” of banks in a national market would protect against moral 
hazard by policing behaviour of counterparties, even in the absence of modern banking 
regulation.  
 
Even after the demise of the Gold Standard, the key role of the LOLR has often been 
considered to offset the risk of a monetary contraction, as in 1932 in the US. However, as 
argued by Kaufman (1991), its more recent operation against a background of deposit 
insurance does not have this function, as a general flight from the banking system to currency 
is unlikely. Rather, crises tend to lead to a reshuffling of deposits between banks, and the 
LOLR seeks to limit losses of wealth and GDP that would otherwise take place when such 
reshuffling occurs. 
 
Focusing now on more recent episodes and the current state of “doctrine” in a modern 
financial system, LOLR intervention can be by direct lending (discount window) or by open 
market operations, as well as by off-balance-sheet guarantees. Some argue that in an advanced 
financial system, LOLR should only be via open market operations, since the market will 
direct liquidity to where it is needed, and the risk of mispricing is avoided (Goodfriend and 
King 1988; Kaufman 1991). Such a policy was clearly successful in the cases of operations 
associated with the spikes in liquidity demand in the Y2K and September 11 episodes, as well 
as after the stock market crash of October 1987.  
                                                 
5
 As noted by Bordo (1990), the Barings rescue included commercial banks and the Banque de France as well as 
the Bank of England. 
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However, Goodhart (1999) argues that LOLR may require direct lending, not open market 
operations, as market lending may fail to reach banks in distress whose failure threatens the 
financial system. This motivated, for example, the rescue of Continental Illinois in 1984, 
which was also thought to give rise to a risk of contagion due to its widespread interbank 
lending links (179 banks were thought to be vulnerable). In 1974 the Bundesbank let the 
Herstatt Bank fail, while giving liquidity assistance to the market in line with Goodfriend and 
King, but the consequence was a global breakdown of payments systems that almost 
precipitated an international financial crisis (Davis 1995). 
 
Instruments of such direct support can be the discounting of eligible paper (such as 
government securities), advanced with or without collateral, and repos of the institution’s 
assets that the central bank is willing to accept. The value of collateral should exceed that of 
the LOLR support. There should be provisions for repayment and the provision of funds by 
the LOLR must be for the short term only, allowing examination of the financial institution 
for long term viability. If there is default on LOLR loans, closure is needed, or if the bank is 
too-big-to-fail, it should be nationalised with owners and senior managers dismissed. 
 
Generally, LOLR to date has been to banks and not for non-banks such as securities houses. 
Reasons are that banks are more systemically important and also so as not to weaken market 
discipline on less heavily regulated institutions. This was one reason for the refusal of the US 
to support Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1989 (although the Bank of Japan did save Yamaichi 
in the 1990s, see Nakaso 2001). Equally, prudent investment banks, although dependent on 
wholesale funding, would typically hold short-term assets, protecting them against liquidity 
risk. [Formatting of this para corrected.] 
 
3.2 Costs of LOLR 
 
There are costs to having a LOLR (He 2000). The LOLR is only supposed to aid illiquid and 
not insolvent institutions (Humphrey and Keleher 1984). However, as noted by Kindleberger 
(1986), in a crisis it is hard to distinguish illiquid and insolvent banks, and a bank that may 
initially be illiquid can become insolvent. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) note that banks 
generally face illiquidity when solvency is in question. Hence, liquidity assistance may lead to 
support for insolvent institutions, with direct costs for the central bank and fiscal authorities. 
Kaufman (1991) notes that the US Federal Reserve System (Fed), for example, supported 
Franklin National in 1974 and Bank of New England in 1990, which both subsequently failed. 
Furthermore, doctrine states that LOLR is not an appropriate policy alone in cases of 
simultaneous macroeconomic shocks to solvency – such as in the contraction of GDP in 
Finland in 1990 – which may require the fiscal authorities to recapitalise banks. 
 
As noted, beyond direct costs, the safety net reduces the incentive for banks to hold liquidity, 
as risk is passed to the central bank (Goodhart 2007). It may also facilitate uninsured 
depositors exiting a bank (Kaufman 1991). Most crucially, LOLR increases moral hazard and 
consequent risk taking, as well as weakening market discipline.
6,7
 Arguably this is particularly 
the case for direct lending as opposed to open market operations. It is widely argued that the 
long-term decline in bank capital adequacy up to the 1988 Basel Agreement, as well as lower 
liquidity buffers, result from moral hazard generated by the safety net.  
 
                                                 
6
 As a consequence, Kane (1992) argues that LOLR is inappropriate and should be abolished given the cost of 
moral hazard. 
7
 This is illustrated by the existence of “support ratings” for banks alongside their standalone ratings. 
 7 
Further costs are that, if offered to insolvent banks, LOLR support increases the scope for 
forbearance. This is because it removes the pressure on regulators to close failing banks 
promptly (especially if the regulator is a separate institution from the central bank). If allowed 
to continue operating, banks with negative net worth can cause major costs, as in the Savings 
and Loan crisis in the US in the 1980s. LOLR for the insolvent institution also raises the 
difficulty of institutions being too-big-to-fail – some banks can become “sure” of rescue 
owing to their systemic importance, and this is also reflected in ratings (again the rescue of 
Continental Illinois was arguably the genesis of this). 
 
A further cost is conflict with other policies. There may be conflicts with the monetary policy 
regime, unless liquidity is fully sterilised (the LOLR action at the time of the stock market 
crash in 1987 was seen as generating inflation). It may also conflict with fiscal rules if there is 
a guarantee by the fiscal authority. 
 
3.3 Minimising costs of LOLR 
 
Doctrine maintains that minimising such costs requires that there be only support for 
institutions whose failure entails systemic risk. The central bank must ensure that banks have 
made efforts to gain liquidity support and all market sources of funds have been exhausted. 
Equally, following Bagehot (1873), the authorities should demand high quality collateral and 
a penalty interest rate. The former protects the central bank from credit risk and encourages 
the banks to lend at lower risk (Goodhart 2007). The latter, along with harsh conditionality 
(for example, liquidity restoration, restrictions on new business or on dividend payments), 
ensures that the borrower only requests LOLR support as a “last resort”. Bordo (1990) notes 
however that in 1974 the Fed offered Franklin National loans at below market rates. 
 
To further reduce moral hazard, doctrine states that the central bank should seek a private 
solution before using the LOLR (from the creditors, other major banks, etc.). This has been 
the tradition in Continental Europe and indeed it is enshrined in French Law. In Germany, the 
private Likobank is intended to substitute for the possibility of the central bank needing to 
undertake LOLR. On the other hand, experience has shown that banks are increasingly less 
willing to play a role in such rescues, owing to deregulation and international competition 
(Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1995). The Bank of England experience with the rescue of 
Johnson Matthey in 1984 showed this. The wholly-private rescue of LTCM in 1998, however, 
was a recent example of creditors being willing to mount a rescue – of a hedge fund – without 
guarantee, showing that private rescues are still viable in extreme cases, with suitable moral 
suasion by central banks. 
 
The LOLR must also ensure that there is adequate information on financial institutions and 
strict financial regulation; although Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) do not conclude that 
there is a benefit to overall financial stability from the central bank being the supervisor. 
 
To avoid monetary conflict, the central bank must sterilise liquidity – otherwise there is a risk 
of inflation, capital outflows and a collapsing currency (as occurred in Indonesia in 1997; He 
2000). This requires instruments be available such as reverse repos, foreign exchange swaps 
and deposit facilities. There is also a need for backup from the fiscal authorities if the rescued 
bank is insolvent, otherwise the central bank may itself face solvency difficulties, as in 
Finland in 1990 when the central bank saved an insolvent savings bank and wiped out its own 
capital. 
 
The central bank, according to doctrine, should reduce moral hazard by making access to 
LOLR facilities uncertain – the market is not to take for granted the action to be followed by 
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the authorities, with decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. The Bank of England has, 
for example, allowed banks such as Barings in 1995 to fail, since it was judged to be non-
systemic. Ambiguity may be heightened by secrecy as to whether LOLR is taking place, as 
with the small UK banks that were rescued in the early 1990s, so as to avoid wider loss of 
confidence and ultimately underwriting the whole banking system (George 1994). 
Confidentiality can also help to prevent knowledge of LOLR support from giving rise to 
panic, a rise in borrowing costs or a loss of reputation to the bank in receipt of LOLR. 
 
He (2000) suggests that central banks could nevertheless spell out necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for LOLR (for example, a precondition of solvency and exhausting available 
sources of funds) – thus reducing incentives for unnecessary crises and giving incentives for 
stabilising private sector actions. This might also reduce risks of forbearance and political 
interference. But ex ante transparency may heighten the risk of runs, and give rise to moral 
hazard (Economist 2008b). There remains a strong case for ex post transparency (that is, 
saying what has been done after the crisis has subsided, to ensure accountability in the use of 
public funds). 
 
Generally to date, LOLR has been in domestic currency (on the argument that banks should 
be responsible for foreign exchange risk management). In this context, there is the unresolved 
problem for cross-border banks (notably in the European Union) of whether the home or host 
LOLR should play the largest role in a crisis. 
 
3.4 LOLR in systemic crises 
 
So far I have discussed LOLR for a non-systemic problem. In times of systemic crisis it may 
act differently (Hoelscher and Quintyn 2003). This is a situation of panic, flight-to-quality and 
widespread contagion. The aim is to reassure the public that financial disorder will be limited 
and to stop panic runs, by public announcements and visibility. The central bank may need to 
provide uniform support for all banks short of liquidity, even if they are suspected to be 
insolvent, in order to protect the payments system and the macroeconomy. Constructive 
ambiguity is no longer appropriate (Nakaso 2001). Collateral and solvency requirements may 
be relaxed, at least if there is a government guarantee. No penalty rates would be imposed as 
they would worsen the panic. Also the central bank would need to suspend judgement of 
which institutions are systemically important. 
 
Emergency liquidity assistance in such cases is to be part of the overall crisis management 
strategy involving the central bank, supervisors and the fiscal authorities. It may require a 
general macroeconomic policy easing (for example, interest rate cuts) as a crisis by itself 
constitutes a tightening of financial conditions. However, care is needed to avoid inflation or 
an exchange rate collapse. There is an option of imposing capital controls (as in Malaysia in 
1997). Costs of such emergency assistance policies can be sizeable. Hoelscher and Quintyn 
(2003) record that liquidity support during the Asian crisis was 16 per cent of GDP in 
Indonesia in the form of overdrafts from the bank, and 13 per cent of GDP in Malaysia from 
central bank deposits (which were, however, repaid). 
 
In a systemic crisis, there may also be a blanket deposit guarantee by the government, as in 
Japan and Sweden in the 1990s, and the fiscal authorities will have to bear the costs of bank 
recapitalisation. The overall fiscal costs of crisis will thus often far exceed the LOLR 
assistance – in Indonesia the overall cost was around 50 per cent of GDP. This potential fiscal 
burden, in turn, helps motivate the separation of regulation from central banks (Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker 1995). It also underlines the point that liquidity assistance must not be a long-
term policy – it should be used to stop panics and buy time for evaluation of the financial 
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system. The government may need to recapitalise or close insolvent banks in a long-term 
restructuring (as took place in Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s). The LOLR is still 
needed in a systemic crisis if the credibility of the deposit insurance scheme is lacking (or 
depositors fear delay in repayments) – in which case the fiscal authorities may also need to 
guarantee the central bank. 
 
Having outlined liquidity risk, bank liquidity policy and the evolving doctrine of the LOLR, I 
now go on to assess whether the current sub-prime crisis requires our understanding of these 
concepts to be revised. 
 
4 Recent developments in liquidity risk 
 
4.1 The sub-prime crisis and liquidity 
 
I suggest that the understanding of the liquidity problems in the current crisis requires theory 
to go beyond the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) concept of bank funding liquidity risk, to 
encompass market liquidity risk and its interaction with funding liquidity against a 
background of heightened credit risk (see also IMF 2008). It also requires consideration of the 
impact of banks’ policies of marking to market, risk management and balance sheet 
management (Adrian and Shin 2008). 
 
Market liquidity risk can be defined as the ease with which one can liquidate a position in an 
asset without appreciably altering its price. Institutions and markets were shown to be much 
closer integrated than in the past. Systemic market liquidity problems were only apparent 
before the sub-prime crisis during the Russia-LTCM crisis (Davis 1999, IMF 1998) – 
although in the case of Russia/LTCM the banks were relatively unscathed. I first describe the 
build up to the sub-prime crisis, as well as the crisis itself, before considering relevant 
liquidity risk paradigms.
8
 
 
Key developments in the period 2000 to 2007 include the accelerating shift by banks from 
holding loans on balance sheet to relying on securitisation (which in turn reduced the 
incentive to monitor loans). Banks held increasingly low levels of on-balance-sheet liquid 
assets and they undertook aggressive wholesale liability management to maintain funding 
levels. Banks also attempted to shift risk to off-balance-sheet conduits and structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs) in order to save capital under Basel 1 rules.
9
 These shifts occurred 
in a context of low global interest rates, arising in turn from high levels of global liquidity, 
which prompted a hunt for yield (for example, via higher credit risk in structured products and 
sub-prime loans). More generally, scope for securitisation (and the impression of liquidity it 
gave), high credit ratings on asset backed securities (ABS) and the seeming precision of risk 
models based on inadequate data, may have lulled banks into taking on more credit risk than 
they otherwise would. 
 
By 2007 there was a growing realisation of potential losses on sub-prime mortgages (that is, 
credit risk) as US house prices fell and defaults increased. These loans had been widely 
packaged into ABS. Investors, concerned not only about losses on the underlying assets but 
also lack of transparency as to how individual ABS would be affected, began to sell them. 
Sales led in turn not just to price falls but also market liquidity failure for the OTC markets 
for the ABS. As prices fell, trading became difficult or impossible, even among the lowest 
risk tranches of the relevant securities. 
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 For a more detailed summary see Brunnermeier (2008). 
9
 The capital charge on credit lines to such subsidiaries were less than those of holding the assets on balance 
sheet. 
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As noted by the ECB (2008), price falls affected not only the standardised instruments such as 
index-based collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) but also the “bespoke” structures that are 
not normally traded but which are nonetheless marked to market. This link followed from the 
fact that implicit prices for the latter are derived from the former. Furthermore, Scheicher 
(2008) shows econometrically that, over and above concerns regarding credit risk, there were 
significant concerns about market liquidity and the lower appetite for risk in accounting for 
the fall in prices (the rise in spreads). Such liquidity and risk aversion effects are omitted from 
standard CDO pricing models.
10
 
 
This liquidity failure was aggravated by rising margin requirements, which limited the 
freedom of speculative investors such as hedge funds, and led them to sell holdings of ABS. It 
was also worsened by the lack of risk capital allocated to market making in such products, due 
to the rise in volatility and lower revenues to investment banks, which limited their ability to 
take risks.  
 
The rush to sell securitised assets may also have been worsened by effects of price falls in the 
context of mark-to-market accounting on the capital of leveraged institutions. Another factor 
was and reliance of some institutions on quantitative techniques of trading and risk 
management that assumed continuous liquidity (IMF 2008). 
 
As a result, long term investors may have been constrained from taking contrarian positions 
that could have renewed market liquidity due to excessive leverage (for example, of hedge 
funds) and consequent credit restrictions in the context of mark-to-market accounting 
(Economist 2008a). Monoline insurers, that provide some credit guarantees to ABS and credit 
default swaps (CDS) themselves, also came under financial pressure (Bank of England 2008). 
 
Banks were also rapidly affected by the loss of liquidity in the market for securitised loans. 
They had to mark-to-market ABS held on-balance-sheet, so price falls affected their solvency. 
This was unlike banking crises in the past where loans have typically been held at historic 
cost with no specific price. The fact that a great many ABS were held in conduits and SIVs 
spread the contagion, since these institutions require financing in the market for asset-backed 
commercial paper. Doubts by money market funds regarding the ABS held by the conduits 
and SIVs led to a loss of liquidity in the ABCP market also, which meant that sponsoring 
banks had to take the assets back on their balance sheets. The extensive holding of US ABS 
by European banks and related conduits and SIVs spread the impact internationally. 
 
Meanwhile, traders’ attempts to hedge, meet margin calls or realise gains in safer or more 
liquid markets adversely affected liquidity in other markets in a contagious manner. Market 
makers in a range of markets were often unwilling to trade at posted prices (IMF 2008) due to 
uncertainty, volatility and concern about the risks of counterparty default. 
 
The crisis has revealed new patterns in funding-liquidity risk which stem from market-
liquidity risks. Banks were unable to securitise the mortgages and other loans they were 
issuing, owing to the collapse of the ABS market. They also experienced calls on backup lines 
of credit for conduits and SIVs that were unable to issue ABCP. Accordingly, banks hoarded 
liquidity in order to provide sufficient funding for their ongoing business. This hoarding was 
aggravated by fear of counterparty risk in the interbank market, due to other banks’ 
undisclosed losses on ABS from stresses affecting credit quality and the availability of 
liquidity. Mark-to-market becomes a highly uncertain process when liquidity collapses (ECB 
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 The corollary is that the potential scale of losses is exaggerated by using a mark-to-market approach to value 
such illiquid securities (Bank of England 2008). 
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2008), giving rise to concern that the assets of counterparties are mismeasured. One 
consequence of these problems of funding-liquidity was the failure of the solvent UK 
mortgage bank Northern Rock, which had an aggressive reliance on both wholesale funding 
and the securitisation of assets, which was no longer feasible (UK Parliament 2008). In 
contrast, the US bank Countrywide was able to rely on liability insurance contracts that 
limited the scope for a run, a feature not present in earlier crises.
11
 
 
These combined features led to the emergence of historically large interest-rate premia – and 
quantity-rationing of funds – in the domestic interbank markets in the US, the UK and the 
euro area, at all but overnight maturities. Funding at three months became particularly 
difficult to obtain. In summary, these patterns in turn meant that funding-liquidity risk was 
closely related to market liquidity risk. Banks were vulnerable to this linkage due to their low 
holdings of liquid assets, increasing reliance on short-term wholesale funding, dependence on 
securitisation, backup lines to SIVs, and the rise in overall maturity mismatch on their balance 
sheets related to “repatriation” of SIVs and conduits.12 
 
4.2 Relevant liquidity risk paradigms 
 
In evaluating the sub-prime crisis, it clearly has elements of the standard liquidity crisis 
paradigm (Tirole 2008), such as an aggregate liquidity shock (fall in house prices), 
deterioration of underlying loan quality, fire sales (of ABS) and runs (on Northern Rock and 
Bear Stearns). Moreover, the run up to the crisis showed the familiar signs of the 
procyclicality of financial markets (Borio et al 2001). However, there were also a number of 
less familiar elements. 
 
I suggest that one helpful paradigm for the crisis is to reinterpret the concept of liquidity 
insurance, central to the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model in the context of securities 
markets. Securities markets offer liquidity insurance, but in a different way to banks, by 
increasing the ease with which assets may be transformed into cash prior to maturity (Davis 
1994; and Bernardo and Welch 2004). Yields are generally lower in highly liquid securities 
markets, as investors are more willing to hold a claim if they are confident of its liquidity. 
Unlike at-call deposits at banks, there is no guarantee of a fixed rate at which securities can be 
liquidated immediately, but short-term high-quality debt securities provide a considerable 
degree of security. Meanwhile, so long as markets remain liquid, the investor benefits from a 
shorter effective maturity than offered by the issuer, thus there is again maturity 
transformation. 
 
Like banking, however, market liquidity depends on all other holders not seeking to realise 
their assets at the same time. If doubt arises over the future liquidity of the securities market it 
is rational to sell first, before the disequilibrium between buyers and sellers becomes too great 
and market failure occurs. That is, prices are driven down sharply, and selling in quantity 
becomes extremely difficult. Such collapses may result from a fear of deteriorating funding 
conditions, which leads a number of investors to sell assets simultaneously before they are 
forced to do so under fire-sale conditions.  
 
A loss of liquidity in debt markets may have externalities similar to bank failures. This may 
be particularly true if: there are leveraged investors who are forced to sell despite such 
illiquidity; there is contagion between markets; illiquidity makes investors unwilling to accept 
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 Goodhart (2007), however, notes that such liability insurance is not a resolution for a systemic crisis, as it 
merely relocates liquidity risk. 
12
 Bradley and Shibut (2006) show that US banks’ ratios of deposits to liabilities fell from 93 per cent in 1965 to 
60 per cent since 2000. 
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new issues; and there are debtors who do not have an alternative source of rollover finance.
13
 
Note that all of these channels are relevant to the description of the sub-prime crisis above, 
particularly with respect to the liquidity failure of the ABS and ABCP markets. Following 
“runs” on these markets, the interbank market was adversely affected, as banks that could not 
securitise – and had to finance backup lines – hoarded liquidity. Such patterns were 
unprecedented, given the enhanced role of banks as asset sellers and liquidity providers. 
 
The nature of liquidity failure in securities markets is further clarified by analysis of the role 
of market makers, whose importance was again outlined in the description above. The 
response of market makers to "one way selling", where the new equilibrium price is uncertain, 
is often simply to refuse to quote firm prices, for fear of accumulating stocks of depreciating 
securities. This contributes to a collapse of liquidity. Uncertainty is crucial; if there is a clear 
new market-clearing price at which buyers will re-emerge, the market makers will adjust their 
prices accordingly. Such uncertainty was seen as a key feature of the recent crisis, relating 
notably to structured products, which had no price history to help predict behaviour under 
stress (Caruana and Kodres 2008), and which also led to banks being unable to price their 
own assets. 
 
The collapse of dealer markets, even in the absence of generalised uncertainty and one way 
selling, may result from perceptions of asymmetric information (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; 
and Kyle 1985). A rise in the share of insiders leads market makers to widen spreads to avoid 
losses. This discourages liquidity traders, who withdraw, increasing adverse selection. Some 
dealers may cease to operate. Once the insiders (with superior information) become too 
numerous, bid and ask prices may be too disparate to allow any trade. Here I note that banks 
feared that others were not disclosing their true losses on ABS, directly and via SIVs, so they 
refused to lend on the interbank market. Equally, ABCP investors doubted the value of assets 
in SIVs and so refused to finance them. In the case of either one way selling or acute 
asymmetric information, the asset market, in effect, ceases to function. The associated decline 
in liquidity is likely to increase sharply the cost of raising primary debt in such a market (that 
is, there will effectively be heightened price rationing of credit), or it may even be impossible 
to gain investor interest at any price (quantity rationing). The closure of markets for 
securitisation fits this description. 
 
The IMF (2008) argue that market liquidity collapses are particularly likely when market 
makers lack absorptive capacity, for example, due to costs of funding inventory and internal 
capital limits, which will in turn relate to whether returns to market making are low. Gromb 
and Vanayos (2008) argue that there is a feedback loop, as price falls hit the capital of dealers, 
making them less willing to make markets. Indeed they may sell existing inventories, 
aggravating the problem. Market liquidity collapses may also occur more commonly when 
there is no clear order of trading, as in OTC markets, and when market makers are risk averse 
(Bernardo and Welch 2004). There can also be spillovers between funding instruments when 
firms are active in several markets, as market makers and/or arbitrageurs, as liquidity needs in 
one market lead to early liquidation of assets in other markets. 
 
Adrian and Shin (2008) also suggest that contagion during the current crisis differed, in quite 
specific ways, from that in traditional liquidity crisis models. The traditional view, as set out 
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 The parallels between banks and securities markets are not exact, since investors who are not constrained to 
sell and do not suffer defaults do not make a loss by “sitting tight” and can still make a profit on their portfolio of 
securities. In other words, markets, unlike banks, may become illiquid but cannot become insolvent. Equally, the 
difficulties for issuers arise only in the case that an existing issue of securities needs rolling over – or there is a 
pressing need for a further issue – when the liquidity problem arises. 
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in Section 1 is that credit risk leads to contagion, either via direct exposures or uncertainty 
over opaque balance sheets. In the current world, Adrian and Shin argue that contagion occurs 
via changes in market prices, according to the way that risks as measured and the mark-to-
market practices of financial institutions. Financial institutions are seen to manage balance 
sheets actively in response to price changes and measured risk. Moreover, this appears to have 
led to a positive relation between changes in leverage of commercial banks and balance sheet 
size, as they have taken on behaviour patterns hitherto more typical of investment banks.  
 
In an upturn, when balance sheets are strong, banks see leverage as too low and seek to 
expand balance sheets by increasing lending and incurring short-term liabilities. This is seen 
as boosting aggregate liquidity across the economy as a whole, facilitating lending to sub-
prime borrowers in the run up to 2007.  As things turn down, perhaps in response to an 
adverse shock to market prices (as occurred due to heightened perceptions of credit risk and 
the collapse of market liquidity in 2007), financial institutions that mark to market find their 
leverage too high and seek to contract their balance sheets. Cifuentes et al (2004) note that 
fire sales of assets by distressed institutions may aggravate such a pattern by further 
depressing market prices. Note the contrast with traditional crises, in which a deterioration of 
credit quality would have no immediate direct effect on the balance sheet assuming that 
valuations are based on book values. Mark-to-market creates a new and much closer link from 
illiquidity to insolvency, since a loss of liquidity causes price falls that impact solvency 
directly, leading in turn to further attempts to sell and further price falls. 
 
Adrian and Shin (2008) show that a pattern of desired reduction in leverage is precisely what 
happened successfully in the Russia/LTCM crisis. However, the current crisis is different 
because banks found themselves obliged to expand credit to cover backup commitments for 
SIVs and conduits, due to the closure of the ABCP market. Also, the closure of the ABS 
market meant that banks had to hold mortgages they were issuing on balance sheet. In such a 
situation, it is argued that they quickly cut back on discretionary lending, most notably to the 
domestic interbank market.  
 
A helpful complementary paradigm of funding liquidity that encompasses some of the events 
of the 2007 and 2008 crisis is provided by Freixas et al (2000b). According to this model, 
liquidity may dry up for a solvent bank in the interbank market if there is imperfect 
information, or if there is market tension which reduces the lending banks’ excess liquidity 
and reduces its scope to diversify. The interbank market as a whole may face liquidity 
problems if each bank refuses to lend to others because it cannot be confident of its own 
ability to borrow, a form of liquidity crisis akin to the Diamond-Dybvig model. 
 
Brunnermeier (2008) talks of four mechanisms by which small shocks are amplified, leading 
to a loss of liquidity. These are first, borrowers’ balance sheet effects comprising a loss spiral 
(as an initial loss on a leveraged balance sheet leads to a decline in net worth, sales and price 
movements, further reducing net worth) and a margin spiral (as increased margins lead to 
deleveraging and sales, leading to lower prices, further increasing margins). Second is a 
lending channel effect (notably precautionary hoarding of liquidity). Third are runs on 
institutions and markets (including the interbank, ABCP and investment bank repo markets). 
Fourth are network effects, for example, when Goldman Sachs expressed concerns about 
exposures to Bear Stearns via swap netting arrangement, hedge funds avoided Bear Stearns as 
a prime broker thereby helping to bring about its demise. 
 
5 The lender of last resort and the sub-prime crisis 
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Besides needing a new understanding of the nature of liquidity failure in financial crises, the 
recent turmoil has raised a number of issues for the traditional LOLR role of central banks 
(described in Section 3 above), suggesting a need to amend the traditional doctrine. These 
issues did not come into play in the same way in the otherwise-similar Russia/LTCM crisis 
(Davis 1999), where the resolution occurred largely via a private sector rescue of the hedge 
fund (albeit under pressure from the Fed) and interest rate cuts by the Fed. Following the 
same order as Section 3, I now go on to discuss issues relating to open market operations and 
individual lending; the nature of open market operations; the widening of the safety net from 
commercial banks; the issue of illiquidity and insolvency; conflicts with other 
macroeconomic policies; collateral policies; private sector rescues; difficulties with 
information; reputation of banks and LOLR confidentiality; interaction with deposit 
insurance; and international concerns. I conclude by pointing out the issue of how authorities 
may exit from current LOLR policies. 
 
I note at the outset that although the sub-prime crisis was seen as giving rise to major risks, 
the operation has not (yet) involved the fiscal authorities in widespread guarantees and 
bailouts as is typical of a major systemic banking crisis as cited in Hoelscher and Quintyn 
(2003). I therefore concentrate on points raised in the non-systemic discussion of current 
doctrine in Sections 3.1-3.3. 
 
5.1 The sub-prime crisis and the nature of LOLR 
 
Earlier I discussed whether open market operations or individual lending was most 
appropriate for LOLR. For the most part during the current crisis, LOLR was in the form of 
open market operations, but under unprecedented conditions. Extreme tightness of the 
interbank market in all but overnight maturities had not hitherto been a feature of domestic 
markets in advanced countries. Accordingly, the Fed and ECB in August 2007 and thereafter 
intervened heavily to overcome the liquidity crisis in the interbank markets – which had 
negated the usual method of distributing liquidity around the banking system, including to 
banks lacking access to open market operations. Note that such policies do appear to be close 
to standard open market operations, but I contend that the emergency operations cited were 
“LOLR-like” in the sense of being to satisfy short term increases in the demand for reserve 
money, as opposed to setting interest rates per se.
14
  
 
Owing to the interbank market difficulties, central banks such as the ECB also felt the need to 
lend in open market operations at longer maturities than had hitherto been the case. In the US, 
the Fed introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF) making funds available at longer terms 
than normal. This extension of the maturity of liquidity assistance was a response to the 
weakness of the longer-term interbank market and the banks’ needs for such funding in the 
light of the collapse of ABCP issuance and the demand for backup facilities. It also meant that 
some players with adequate liquidity positions had even more scope to hoard liquidity. [I’d 
rather keep this.] 
 
One puzzle in the current crisis is why it is so protracted given the amount of support central 
banks have offered to markets and institutions. A key issue is of course the underlying 
uncertainty about the valuation of assets on banks balance sheets. But, as Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2008) argue, there may also be underlying uncertainty as to whether central 
banks have the liquidity and instruments to resolve the crisis. 
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 Goodhart (1999) maintains that only support for individual banks should be termed LOLR. 
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I noted in Section 3.1 that traditionally LOLR assistance has been provided only to 
commercial banks. The Fed was forced to implicitly extend safety net protection to include 
investment banks, incurring a balance sheet guarantee for the Bear Stearns rescue via JP 
Morgan. It also made emergency liquidity available to investment banks more generally.
15
 
The Bear Stearns situation showed that some investment banks have become sufficiently 
systemic to warrant such rescues, not due to the size of their balance sheets but because of 
their central role in the markets for credit default and interest rate swaps (Economist 2008a). 
Equally, however, some argue that Bear Stearns had departed from the traditional model of 
investment banking by holding long term illiquid assets, making it particularly vulnerable to 
liquidity risk. Given this precedent, and wider liquidity provision, investment banks are now 
accorded unprecedented protection for their risk taking activities, which is widely seen as 
requiring tighter regulation. 
 
5.2 The sub-prime crisis and the costs of LOLR 
 
The role of markets in the current crisis made the issue of only lending to the illiquid and not 
the insolvent a more complex one. In effect, central banks were at times lending in order to 
reliquify markets (also via collateral as discussed below) and only indirectly to provide 
liquidity to institutions. A market can obviously not become insolvent but its liquidity can 
impact on institutions’ solvency, as the sub-prime crisis showed and Section 4.2 highlighted. 
 
Conflicts with other policies loomed large during the current crisis. Central banks injecting 
liquidity at times faced the challenge of not changing the overall monetary policy stance in an 
undesired manner. Given the need for liquidity at longer maturities than normal, sometimes 
this would entail central banks withdrawing liquidity at shorter maturities to keep the 
monetary policy stance unchanged. I note that there remained a challenge also to traditional 
interest rate setting given the unprecedented and persistent spreads between LIBOR and 
central bank rates, that made official rates a poor indicator of the true stance of monetary 
policy (Martin 2008). 
 
An unanswered question in the current crisis is how much moral hazard has been generated by 
these “new” LOLR policies. Certainly aspects, such as the extension of the safety net to 
investment banks and the easing of collateral policies, as discussed below, could have the 
effect of worsening moral hazard. 
 
5.3 The sub-prime crisis and minimising costs of LOLR 
 
It was noted that requiring good collateral is a key basis of the traditional doctrine of the 
LOLR. Some central banks implicitly responded to the loss of market liquidity in 2007 and 
2008 by reducing collateral standards (accepting residential mortgages, and even ABS). This 
in turn could be seen as reliquifying the ABS market indirectly, in effect setting prices for 
those assets, as market maker of last resort. The Fed and the Bank of England extended their 
lists of eligible collateral, the Fed including credit derivatives in eligible collateral. Eventually 
the Bank of England set up a system of long term swaps for mortgages and ABS with 
government bonds, thought likely to total over £50 billion, but only for assets already held on 
the banks’ balance sheets in December 2007. 
 
This easing of collateral requirements is an inversion of traditional LOLR rules, with central 
banks possibly accepting excessive credit risk (although the latter is controlled by haircuts, 
notably by the Bank of England) and also potentially encouraging banks to continue risky 
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lending practices (if such loans can still be used as collateral), and correspondingly justifying 
the banks’ low levels of liquid assets (Goodhart 2008b). Meanwhile banks had the incentive 
to hoard top quality collateral, and central banks may risk becoming lenders of first resort, 
facing adverse selection as banks have an incentive to offer up the worst quality assets as 
collateral. This was an issue for the ECB, which did not expand its already-extensive list of 
eligible collateral, but did find that banks were undertaking ABS securitisations solely for 
ECB collateral (Economist 2008b). 
 
Doctrine states that private sector solutions need to be sought in order that LOLR policies 
avoid generating moral hazard. But in general these were not forthcoming in the sub-prime 
crisis. Northern Rock had to be rescued by the Bank of England and the UK government 
rather than a private sector buyer being found. Bear Stearns was only bought by JPMorgan 
with a Fed guarantee. These cases underline, on the one hand, the wide scale and scope of the 
problem, with few banks feeling strong enough to step forward as buyers. On the other hand, 
they also reflect the uncertainty about valuations, which may have hindered private sector 
buyers from stepping forward. In the case of Northern Rock, prospective buyers in advance of 
the run were put off by the liquidity problems of the bank, as well as the protracted process of 
takeover in the UK (UK Parliament 2008, pp51-52). 
 
Adequate information was noted to be essential for efficient operation of LOLR. Northern 
Rock presented a challenge for the UK’s nascent tripartite agreement. It was considered that 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) did not warn the Bank of England of the risk to 
Northern Rock in a timely manner. Eichengreen (2008) attributes such problems to 
differences in bureaucratic incentives and questions whether separation of regulation and 
LOLR is appropriate. The UK is introducing an enhanced role in financial stability for the 
Bank of England to rebalance the relationship between the Bank of England and the FSA.
16
 
 
The loss of reputation for banks obtaining support and the confidentiality of the LOLR has 
become an important issue (Goodhart 2008b). In the UK, LOLR support was offered to the 
solvent bank Northern Rock as it had suffered a loss of wholesale funding, on which it was 
heavily dependent, and it was considered too big to fail. This support was planned to be 
announced by the Bank of England, unlike its past behaviour to keep such interventions 
secret. (It has been reported that the Treasury Solicitor gave advice that secrecy was illegal 
under EU financial regulations.) However, the announcement was pre-empted by a leak to the 
British Broadcasting Corporation on the previous day. This is in stark contrast to earlier 
episodes when support was covert and successfully so.
17
 There followed a retail run which 
was only stopped by a government guarantee – the bank was ultimately nationalised.18 The 
internet facilitated the retail run in a manner that would not have been feasible in the past, 
both via direct withdrawals and panic when the bank’s website crashed. 
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 As set out by the UK Chancellor in June 2008, current proposals are, first, for provision of a statutory 
responsibility for financial stability for the Bank of England; second, changes to the governance structures of the 
Bank of England, to support the Bank and the Governor in the exercise of these new responsibilities, including 
the establishment of a new Financial Stability Committee of the Court; and third, provision of a range of tools 
for the Bank of England to enable it to carry out its responsibility in this area. This will include a leading role in 
the implementation of the new special resolution regime (SRR), should it be triggered by the FSA, including 
powers related to deploying and implementing the SRR tools.. These proposals will be included in the Banking 
Reform bill, to be introduced later in 2008. 
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 The Bank of Japan faced similar challenges in 1998 when deciding not to offer LOLR to the bank LTCB, for 
fear of a loss of reputation. However, in that case a merger was seen as probable if not certain (Nakaso 2001). 
18
 Further difficulties arose thereafter for the UK authorities owing to the lack of a special insolvency scheme for 
banks in that country. 
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Particularly in the wake of this, banks were unwilling to access central bank lending facilities, 
for fear of similar reputation risk. Rather they increased market demands for liquidity, for 
example, via backup facilities, that may have worsened the tight liquidity situation (IMF 
2008). The responses to such reputational issues, also present in the US, included the TAF 
whereby the Fed made funds available not only at longer terms but also to a wider range of 
counterparties and with a wider range of collateral. This was seen as not carrying a stigma in 
contrast to discount window borrowing (the rate for which was meanwhile reduced, contrary 
to traditional doctrine, to seek to avoid stigma). 
 
The growing public awareness of limitations of the UK’s deposit insurance scheme was a 
feature in the Northern Rock case. This featured co-insurance up to a low maximum sum, and 
no guarantee of a prompt payout. By its nature, it seeks to provide protection from moral 
hazard, incentives to monitor and a degree of consumer protection – not to protect against 
runs (Goodhart 2008a). The lesson is that LOLR may be called upon more often in such 
regimes because of runs – but a comprehensive guarantee risks generating a lot of moral 
hazard (and makes more urgent a bank insolvency regime for “prompt corrective action”). 
Some would argue that it was deposit insurance problems rather than systemic risk that 
motivated the Northern Rock rescue. 
 
I noted above that the traditional LOLR was confined to the domestic banking system. The 
crisis revealed that the traditional LOLR is unsuited to the internationalised banking system. 
This was evident in the lack of liquidity in dollars for European banks, following disruption in 
the foreign currency swaps market, as underlying money markets dried up. This meant that 
banks were unable to arrange liquidity to meet payment requirements in different currencies. 
This was eased in December 2007 by cross currency swap arrangements between the ECB, 
Swiss National Bank and the Fed, linked to the TAF mentioned above.  
 
It can be argued that the domestic focus of LOLR worsened uncertainty in the globalised 
banking community, where banks have exposures in many currencies. Cooperation between 
central banks had to be increased due to the need to avoid liquidity support operations 
affecting domestic monetary conditions that could have influenced the euro/dollar exchange 
rate. Equally, there may be a need to avoid international banks “gaming” between different 
collateral requirements at the major central banks (Economist 2008b), which may in turn 
necessitate further coordination of collateral policy (Financial Stability Forum 2008). On the 
other hand, there was not a major failure of a cross border institution, that will in a future 
crisis severely test cross-border central bank and fiscal authorities cooperation.
19
 
 
Finally, the central banks face a challenge in terms of exit strategies from some of the 
measures that have been adopted for the crisis. They will need to prevent moral hazard, for 
example, by retightening collateral regimes to avoid banks having long run incentives to hold 
less, low quality collateral. They will also need to ensure that the interbank market is 
reactivated, for example, by reducing term lending facilities when they are no longer needed. 
The Economist (2008b) [Not italic] suggests that similar issues of generous LOLR holding 
back revival of publicly traded markets will arise for the European ABS market, that in mid 
2008 consisted mainly of securities for collateral with the ECB.
20
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 As noted, the Fed accepts credit derivatives in liquidity operations while others do not, while the ECB allows 
for newly created ABS while the Bank of England restricts access to its long-term liquidity to securities already 
on banks’ balance sheets in December 2007. 
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 The Economist [Not italic] quotes an estimate by JPMorgan that euro 320 billion in eligible mortgage backed 
ABS were created from August 2007 to June 2008 but only euro 5.8 billion were placed with investors. 
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Conclusion 
 
It is well known that liquidity risks are endemic to banks given the maturity transformation 
they undertake. The first line of defence should be appropriate liquidity policy on the asset 
and liability side, supported by adequate capital and robust supervision. Despite these, solvent 
banks can face liquidity difficulties at times of stress, necessitating liquidity support.  
 
As doctrine has developed, the role of the LOLR is to avoid unnecessary failures, with 
suitable safeguards for central bank balance sheets and to minimise moral hazard. The role of 
LOLR in crisis periods is to prevent contagious panic by all means available – the central 
bank in such cases requires government support. LOLR must be a temporary policy with 
restructuring of distressed banks and corporate borrowers in the long term. 
 
The current crisis has shown that traditional models of banking risk and of LOLR require 
revision, as was already apparent to a lesser extent in the Russia/LTCM episode. Funding risk 
now interacts with market liquidity risk, to create difficult challenges for central banks. Runs 
must be envisaged in markets and not just banks, which given mark-to-market accounting, 
leads to threats to the liquidity and solvency of banks via changes in market prices.  
 
As a consequence, extensive changes to the traditional LOLR have been necessary, including: 
longer term funding provision with a variety of lower quality collateral; bringing investment 
banks into the safety net; and difficult challenges related to confidentiality of bank support 
and the interaction with deposit insurance. It is an important issue to investigate whether the 
net effect of these changes has been to increase moral hazard, the Achilles Heel of the safety 
net. There also remains the unresolved issue of failure of cross border institutions. 
 
Beyond the scope of this paper, there is a further challenge to develop regulation of bank 
liquidity so that the LOLR is not so essential in future episodes. This could involve a liquidity 
adjustment to value-at-risk estimates to incorporate maturity transformation, measurement of 
stock liquidity and appropriate market and funding liquidity stress tests (IMF 2008, Goodhart 
2007). 
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